A Retaliatory Lawsuit Over a DMV Complaint? Connecticut’s Litigation Privilege and Anti-SLAPP Statute Both Offer a Way Out
I love it when a brand new appellate case reads like a perfect illustration of something I’ve been thinking about for years. Connecticut’s Appellate Court just released Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co. The court officially released the decision on March 24, 2026. Nobody in the case filed a SLAPP motion. But the whole thing runs on the same logic as Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a.
Let me walk you through it.
The Case
A handful of Connecticut towing and auto repair companies — Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage, Chris’ Auto Clinic, MyHoopty.com, and Farmington Auto Park — sued GEICO and two of its investigators. The towing and repair companies alleged that GEICO filed hundreds of false or exaggerated complaints against them with the Connecticut DMV. These complaints disputed charges for nonconsensual towing and storage of vehicles and GEICO filed them over the course of several years. Hundreds. If you’re a tow company owner, that’s not a rival snapping at your heels — that’s a rival that never leaves. The plaintiffs also claimed GEICO’s employees called customers directly and encouraged them to file their own complaints. So the tow companies sued for tortious interference, defamation, and promissory estoppel — the whole menu.
GEICO moved to dismiss. GEICO argued that the litigation privilege protected its DMV complaints. The litigation privilege is a common-law doctrine that grants absolute immunity from suit for statements someone makes in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case. The Appellate Court affirmed.
Worth pausing on the timeline here: the plaintiffs alleged this pattern of complaints stretched back to at least 2017. The Appellate Court didn’t resolve the case until 2026. That’s nearly a decade of towing and storage fee disputes working their way through complaint after complaint. A court didn’t decide whether anyone could sue over any of it until nearly ten years had passed.
Why the DMV Complaint Process Qualified for Connecticut Litigation Privilege
Before a court will even talk about whether immunity or litigation privilege existed in the prior proceedings (here the DMV complaint process), it has to decide whether those proceedings actually occurred in a judicial or quasi-judicial type forum. Connecticut uses a six-factor test from Kelley v. Bonney. The test asks whether the body has power to exercise judgment and discretion, hear and determine facts, and issue binding orders. It also asks whether the body can affect personal or property rights, examine witnesses and hold something like a hearing, and enforce its decisions.
The court found that the DMV’s complaint-and-hearing process checked those boxes. The department investigates complaints, can hold hearings, and can revoke or suspend a towing business’s license. That’s not a slap on the wrist; that’s the whole business. The court also leaned on a prior case, Lucky 13 Industries v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. That case recognized that the legislature built this whole regulatory scheme to fix an imbalance of power between tow companies and car owners. Car owners have little leverage once a tow truck has already hooked up their vehicle and driven away.
The tow companies pushed back. They argued that GEICO’s complaints were really more like an informal tip to the police. Under a 2007 Connecticut Supreme Court case called Gallo v. Barile, an informal tip to police gets only qualified immunity, not the absolute kind. The Appellate Court didn’t buy that argument. A tip to police might lead somewhere someday, but a DMV complaint starts the proceeding the moment someone files it. That difference, between “might” and “does,” was enough to swing the case.
How the Connecticut Anti-SLAPP Statute Applies to This Case
Here’s the part that got me excited. Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute lets a defendant file a special motion to dismiss early in a case, and it automatically stays discovery. A defendant can file this motion when a lawsuit against them arises from exercising the right to free speech, petition, or association on a matter of public concern. If the plaintiff can’t then show probable cause of winning on the merits, the case gets tossed and the defendant collects attorney’s fees.
Modzelewski’s checks the boxes that analysis cares about, even though GEICO never invoked the statute:
First, the “public concern” requirement. Anti-SLAPP protection only kicks in when the underlying conduct connects to something the public actually has a stake in. It doesn’t apply to a private dispute between two parties. The court’s discussion of the regulatory purpose behind nonconsensual towing rules is exactly the kind of public interest that I think clears this bar.
Second, the range of available defenses. A defendant filing a special motion to dismiss under § 52-196a can raise virtually any recognized defense, including immunity. The litigation privilege that saved GEICO here is an immunity defense. If GEICO had raised it inside a special motion to dismiss instead of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, it would have done exactly the same job.
Third, and this is the pattern I see most often: a party files a complaint with a state licensing or regulatory board. The party on the receiving end gets annoyed, or worried about the consequences, and retaliates with a lawsuit. That’s the textbook fact pattern behind a huge share of anti-SLAPP motions. Modzelewski’s fits it almost exactly, just with GEICO in the role of the regulatory complainant.
Connecticut Litigation Privilege and the Anti-SLAPP Statute: Two Doctrines, One Policy
The litigation privilege and Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute are doing the same job through different doors. Both exist because Connecticut wants people and businesses to report problems to the government without fear of expensive litigation. The litigation privilege protects that kind of speech by stripping the court of jurisdiction outright, and it has done so since long before anti-SLAPP statutes existed. The anti-SLAPP statute does similar work through an early motion process. It adds an extra kick: fee-shifting. A defendant who wins a special motion to dismiss doesn’t just win the case — they also recover their attorney’s fees.
It’s also worth noting just how much procedural ground this case covered before anyone got near the merits. The plaintiffs filed four revised complaints, there were many motions filed during the lawsuit. They filed all of this years apart from the conduct it’s actually about. If you ever wondered why litigation privilege and anti-SLAPP motions exist at all, this is your answer. Nobody wants to spend years — let alone the better part of a decade — fighting over whether they had the right to complain to the DMV in the first place.
In Modzelewski’s, the litigation privilege alone got the job done. GEICO never needed the newer statutory tool. That won’t always be the case, and honestly, that’s what makes this one worth sitting with. If a lawsuit targets statements your business made to a regulator, have a lawyer look at both doctrines. Sometimes one fits better than the other, and sometimes both apply at once.
Let’s Talk
I have always loved talking through cases like this one. My team will tell you I’ve been that way since my days at a large firm. I’ve always wanted to dig into the decision and figure out what it actually means in practice. That hasn’t changed. It’s just that now I’d rather have that conversation with you.
If you’re wondering what Modzelewski’s Towing & Storage v. Government Employees Ins. Co. might mean for your business specifically, give us a call. This is especially true if your business regularly deals with a state agency, licensing board, or regulator. We’re good at translating what courts say into what it means for the way you run your business. And we genuinely enjoy the conversation.
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